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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case arises from an appeal of a summary judgment entered
by the Honorable Gary D. Stott, Fourth District Court Judge for
Utah County, State of Utah.

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction

of the appeal of the summary judgment pursuant to Utah Code Ann.,
Section

78-2a-3 (2) (j)

and

Rule

3,

Utah

Rules

of

Appellate

Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The following issues are presented for review:
A.

Genuine disputed material facts.

In light of the issue of genuine disputed material facts, did
the

trial

Court

err

in

granting

summary

judgment

for

the

Appellees/Defendants?
The standard of review is that summary judgment is appropriate
only when no genuine issues of material facts exist and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Entitlement to

summary judgment is a question of law, and the Appellate Court
should not accord any deference to the Trial Court's resolution of
the legal issues presented.

K&T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623,

627 (Utah 1994).
B.

Appellees/Defendants
exercised
malice
in
writing the grievance and the grievance
demonstrated malice on its face.

Did the trial Court err in granting summary judgment that the
Appellees/Defendants did not write and publish the grievance with
malice and that the grievance does not constitute legal malice
under Utah Law?
1

The standard of review is that summary judgment is appropriate
only when no genuine issues of material facts exist and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Entitlement to

summary judgment is a question of law, and the Appellate Court
should not accord any deference to the Trial Court's resolution of
the legal issues presented.

K&T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623,

627 (Utah 1994).
C.

Appellees/Defendants did not institute an
administrative hearing therefore there is no
governmental immunity.

Did the trial Court err in granting summary judgment that the
Appellees/Defendants

were

immune

from

liability

because

they

initiated an administrative hearing when in fact no governmental
entity conducted an administrative hearing?
The standard of review is that summary judgment is appropriate
only when no genuine issues of material facts exist and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Entitlement to

summary judgment is a question of law, and the Appellate Court
should not accord any deference to the Trial Court's resolution of
the legal issues presented.

K&T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623,

627 (Utah 1994).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
The Appellant/Plaintiff

filed

a

complaint

(hereinafter

seeking

referred

to as

(hereinafter referred to as "Brown")
damages

from

"municipal

Appellees/Defendants

employees" or by

their

individual names) for defamation per se, alleging malice. The Utah
2

Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann., Section 63-30-4, does
not protect municipal employees if they act through malice or
fraud.

The municipal employees published a grievance against Brown

containing written statements, as opposed to allegations, that
Brown

had

committed

unprofessionally

in

crimes, violated
his

public

civil

office.

rights, and
The

effect

of

acted
the

statements was to hold Brown up to public contempt and ridicule.
The municipal employees

responded with the argument that they

were protected by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code
Ann., Section 63-30-10.

They filed a motion for summary judgment

based upon the doctrine of governmental immunity.
Brown opposed the motion for summary judgment.

He asserted

that there were disputed material facts and provided affidavits
disputing the facts of the municipal employees.
Notwithstanding the assertion of disputed material facts, the
Judge ruled that the municipal employees were protected by Section
63-30-10 and, that as a matter of law, malice was not present on
the face of the grievance.

The trial Court granted the municipal

employees' motion for summary judgment.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.
Brown filed a Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. [R. 1-12.]

Brown filed an Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. [R. 1336.] The municipal employees filed an Answer, Cross-claim and Jury
Demand. [R. 43-54.]
The municipal employees filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
supported by a memorandum and supporting affidavits. [R. 83 0-892.]
3

Brown filed a Memorandum Opposing Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment and supporting affidavits. [R. 916-955.]

The response of

Brown asserted that there were disputed material facts and that the
municipal employees acted through malice. [R. 907-915.]
The Honorable Gary D. Stott, Fourth District Judge, heard oral
arguments on August 13, 1999. [R. 1028.]

The Court granted the

municipal employees' Motion for Summary Judgment.

On September 9,

1999, the Court entered the Order and Summary Judgment. [R. 102 91032.]
C.

Statement of Facts.
In 1993, the citizens of American Fork City elected Brown to

the American

Fork City Council.

During his term he

actively

supported three positions with which American Fork City employees
generally disagreed: remodeling the 90-year-old Harrington School
Building to serve as a city hall; maintaining city hall in its
central

location

in

town;

and

conducting

an

independent

investigation of the police department. [R. 542.]
Municipal

employees

Carl

Wanlass,

Debbie

Hansen,

Gary

Caldwell, Cindy Walker, Shauna Thomas, Ken Smith, Terry V. Fox, and
others

wanted

American

Fork

to

remove

City

former Mayor

before

his

term

Jess

Green

expired.

as Mayor
The

of

municipal

employees tried to oust Green from the position of mayor. [R. 542.]
The police investigated Green for alleged theft of a thirtytwo-cent drink from a convenience store.

Someone with access to

the records released his police investigation files to the news
media.

These allegations were extensively reported in newspapers
4

and other media sources, including national outlets. [R. 542.]
Throughout

this

American Fork City.

time, Brown

supported

Green

as Mayor

of

Afterwards, because Brown supported Mayor

Green and the positions that Brown took opposing the desires of the
municipal employees, the municipal employees used the same tactics
on Brown to try and remove him from office. [R. 541-542.]
There were disputes among members of the city council
American Fork City regarding city business.

in

Nevertheless, there

were issues on which the members of the city council unanimously
agreed.

In particular, in response to Brown's request for an

independent investigation of the American Fork Police Department,
the city council voted unanimously on May 14, 1997, to conduct an
independent investigation of the police. [R. 621-622.]
In June 1997, there were two city council meetings, one on
June 10 and the other on June 24.
potential

purchase

of

7.5

Both meetings dealt with the

acres of

land on the west

side of

American Fork City for the purpose of relocating the city hall.
Brown opposed the purchase of land to relocate the city hall.

When

it became evident that the effort to purchase the land would fail,
Carl Wanlass, the City Administrator and one of the parties, whose
responsibility was to attend all city council meetings, became so
angry that he left the meeting before it was over and did not
return. [R. 541.]
Kevin Bennett, American Fork City Attorney, spoke to Brown at
the conclusion of the city council meeting.

Bennett had written a

letter to another attorney wherein he had stated members of the
5

city council asked advice from him to oust the mayor, and the mayor
asked advice from him to prevent the city council from ousting him
from office.

Brown had read the letter.

Brown was concerned that

Bennett had a serious conflict of interest.
about the conflict.

Brown asked Bennett

Bennett became very agitated and said he was

thinking of resigning.

Brown said, "Resign tomorrow."

became even more agitated and heated

Bennett

in his conversation with

Brown. [R. 541.]
Brown later learned that during the city council meeting on
June

24,

19 97,

Jay

Christensen,

a

city

employee,

comments but did not make any public statements.
he did not seek recognition to speak publicly.
sat

at

the

rear of

the city council

made

muted

In other words,

Rather, Christensen

chambers

and made

muted

comments that could be heard only by the citizens who were trying
to address the city council.

Brown became aware of the muted and

intimidating comments that Christensen voiced.

Brown looked for

Christensen on the evening of June 24, 1997, to discuss the matter
with him but could not find him. [R. 540-541.]
On June 25, 1997, Brown saw Christensen at the city hall and
told him that it was inappropriate to make muted comments that
intimidated citizens in city council meeting.

Brown further told

Christensen that if he wanted to speak in city council meetings he
should raise his hand, be acknowledged, and speak publicly.

Even

a

city

statement

of Wanlass

recognized

that

Brown

encouraged

employees to attend city council meeting and participate but not
make muted comments. [R. 585-592.]
6

Wanlass
Christensen.
employees.

came

into the city hall while Brown

talked

with

Wanlass told Brown not to not speak to the city
Brown responded by saying he could talk to any city

employee that he desired. [R. 585-592.]
Wanlass became belligerent

toward

Brown.

Wanlass

walked

toward Brown and stood so close that the parties almost touched.
Brown could see Wanlass' eyes through his dark glasses.
not move toward Wanlass.
from Brown.

Brown did

Christensen asked Wanlass to move away

After an extended period of time, Wanlass did move

away from Brown. [R. 585-5 92.]
Brown

left

the building

to

look

for

the police.

Brown

perceived that he had been assaulted by Wanlass.

Brown approached

two police

standing

officers and

Christensen who were

sidewalk immediately south of the city hall.

on the

Brown told Terry Fox,

a lieutenant on the police department and one of the parties to
this action, that Brown wanted to file a complaint for assault.
Fox said to go to the police department to file the complaint.
Brown said that he couldn't right then, he had a meeting to attend,
but he would take care of the matter in the afternoon.

[R. 585-

592.]
Brown then turned his head to look at Christensen and told
Christensen to write down his recollections of what had happened
and to remember that Wanlass came down the stairs toward Brown.

It

was at that time that Fox, before he said anything, suddenly lunged
toward Christensen and Brown's left side.

In the instant Brown saw

a movement in his peripheral vision and had the perception that Fox
7

was coming toward him.

Consequently, Brown lifted his left hand

with opened palm to keep Fox from striking him.
not

make

contact

with

Brown.

Christensen away from Brown.

Rather,

he

However, Fox did
violently

shoved

As Fox was returning to his original

position on the sidewalk, Brown inadvertently and unintentionally
touched Fox on his left shoulder with Brown's open left hand.
told Brown not to touch him or he would arrest Brown.

Fox

Brown

responded and said, "Okay, I won't touch you, but you moved toward
me."

Neither Fox nor Officer Peterson cited Brown for assaulting

a police officer. [R. 585-592.]
Brown
disorderly

was

eventually

conduct,

an

served

infraction.

a

summons
The

and

charge

charged
of

with

disorderly

conduct, an infraction, was dismissed with prejudice as though the
charge had never been filed. [R. 606-607, 620.]
On or about July 1, 1997, 45 or more employees of American
Fork City

(many signatures cannot be recognized, therefore the

designation of John Does as parties) signed a written grievance
against Brown in his capacity as a member of the city council.
grievance did not make allegations against Brown.

The

Rather, the

grievance made statements of fact. The statements in the grievance
about Brown are not true. [R. 1-3.]
The grievance stated that Brown violated freedom of speech of
employees.

Rather, Brown directed a city employee not to make

muted comments in city council meeting. [R. 1-3, 932-933.]
The grievance stated that Brown was abusive and threatening to
employees and caused Pam Baldwin (now deceased), a female employee
8

to cry.
City

Brown was not abusive and threatening to any American Fork

employees.

Brown

did

not

yell

at

Pam

Baldwin,

former

secretary to the American Fork City Recorder, to the point that she
broke down in tears. [R. 935-936.]
Brown was inquiring about Baldwin's health and activities when
he realized that she was adding a new item to the agenda for the
next city council meeting at the direction of Wanlass, the American
Fork City Administrator.

Brown knew that Mayor Green did not want

that item on the agenda. [R. 935.]
Normally Richard M. Colburn, the American Fork City Recorder,
personally prepared the agendas for the city council meeting, but
Colburn was on vacation.

Brown directed Baldwin to immediately

call Mayor Green and advise him what she was doing and verify that
he approved the new item on the agenda.

Brown told Baldwin that

the mayor did not want the new item on the agenda.

Brown cautioned

Baldwin that she should not get in the middle of a power struggle
between Wanlass and the mayor.

Brown then left to attend to some

other business. [R. 935.]
Subsequently, Brown returned to the office of Baldwin, who was
on the telephone.

From listening to the statements of Baldwin,

Brown could tell that she was discussing the new item for the
agenda.

Brown knew that Wanlass had previously prepared a letter

of reprimand for Baldwin.

Brown also knew that neither the mayor

nor Wanlass had delivered the letter of reprimand
Brown was

concerned

that

as a consequence

to Baldwin.

of Baldwin

getting

involved in the power struggle between the mayor and Wanlass that
9

one of them would give the reprimand letter to her.

Consequently,

when Brown discovered Baldwin had not been talking to the mayor
about the agenda item, he sternly instructed her to immediately
call the mayor and disclose the instructions from Wanlass to add
the item to the agenda. [R. 934-935.]
Brown then went to his own office and called Mayor Green to
alert him to the problem with the agenda.

Brown explained to the

mayor how Baldwin was caught in the middle between the mayor and
Wanlass.

Brown asked the mayor not to give the letter of reprimand

to Baldwin.

To the best of Brown's knowledge, Pam Baldwin never

received the letter of reprimand. [R. 919, 934.]
Subsequently, Brown learned that Baldwin had cried because of
the situation.

Brown apologized to her if he had offended her, but

explained to her that he did not want her in the middle of a power
struggle between the mayor and Wanlass. [R. 934.]
The grievance stated that Brown had committed two crimes:
assaulting a police officer and disorderly conduct.

Eventually,

Brown was charged with disorderly conduct, an infraction. However,
the Court dismissed the charge as though it had never been filed.
[R. 606-607, 617.]
The American Fork City Personnel Policies do not provide for
administrative proceedings against members of the Governing Body.
Wanlass was concerned about that and sent a memorandum, dated July
2, 1997, to the city recorder and the city attorney to investigate
if the grievance would initiate an administrative proceeding.

The

city attorney, Kevin Bennett, responded with an attorney's opinion,
10

dated July 8, 1997, that stated the grievance could not institute
an

administrative

action

against

Brown

because

there

is

no

provision in the personnel policy and procedures to take action
against a member of the governing body.

The governing body of

American Fork City did not initiate any administrative hearing or
proceeding against Brown. [R. 929-930.]
On

July

3,

1997, at

1:58

p.m.

the American

Fork

Department made a nine minute fax transmission to The
Tribune

at telephone number (801) 521-9418.

Police

Salt

Lake

On the same day at

approximately 3:00 p.m., Phil Miller, a reporter for The Salt
Tribune

called

documents.

Brown

to

ask

about

the

police

Lake

investigation

Brown did not know about a police report.

[R. 578,

615.]
After obtaining a copy of the initial contact report from the
police department, Brown called Miller to answer his questions.
Miller not only had the initial contact report, but he had a
supplemental police report, the witnesses' statements, and the
employees' grievance against Brown.
witnesses'

The police reports and the

statements were protected documents pursuant

Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA).

to the

Brown had

the initial contact report, but he did not have the other records.
During the conversation, Miller asked pointed questions about the
initial

contact

report,

the

supplemental

witnesses' statements, and the grievance.

police

report,

the

The resulting newspaper

story, dated July 4, 1997, contained quotes from police reports and
witness statements (protected records). [R. 580-581, 615.]
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At the conclusion of the conversation, Brown asked Miller if
he could get copies of the documents from Miller.
would send the copies to Brown.

Miller said he

Subsequently, Miller changed his

mind about sharing the records he had received from American Fork
City.

Miller sent a fax to Brown stating it was not appropriate

for a news reporter to become a player in a story.
reporter should just report the news.

Rather, a

Miller further stated that

it would be inappropriate for him to divulge any source, or any
documents from a source, including a document from Brown. [R. 6 0 8.]
The Daily

Herald

published portions of the supplemental police

report written by Terry Fox in an article published in July 1997,
titled, "Cop, councilman clash."

The following quotes from Fox's

Supplemental Report were published in the article:
"I started to walk away and Brown reached out with his
right hand and grabbed me by the biceps on the left arm
and pushed me with the same hand, stopping my movement,"
Fox said in a report on the incident. "I felt threatened
at this point that Brown was going to continue the
assault on me.7' [R. 614.]
Between July and October of 1997, agents of The Daily
The Salt

Lake

Tribune,

and Deseret

Herald,

News acknowledged that they had

not made GRAMA requests for the documents pertaining to Brown;
nevertheless, the American Fork Police Department provided

the

investigation files to them. [R. 613-614.]
Bekki Janson, a reporter for The Daily

Herald,

told Brown that

John Durrant, American Fork Chief of Police, caused the initial
police contact report, supplemental police report, and witnesses'
statements to be faxed to her at The Daily
1997, The Daily

Herald

Herald.

On July 7,

faxed a copy of Brown's statement to the
12

American Fork police. [R. 614-615.]
Subsequently, Bekki Janson, reporter for The

Daily

Herald,

again told Brown that Chief of Police John Durrant had caused the
investigation records about Brown to be faxed to The Daily

Herald.

Bekki Janson independently confirmed to Mayor Jess Green that John
Durrant caused the investigation records to be faxed to The
Herald.

Daily

[R.614, 635.]

On Wednesday, August

27, 1997, the American

published Scott Roudabush's letter to the editor.

Fork

Scott Roudabush

was present at the June 24, 1999-city council meeting.

The letter

stated in part as follows:
In the city council meeting held on June 24, 1997,
not all of the citizens in attendance followed rules of
order. There are rules of order to follow when making
comments and suggestions. Jay Christensen did not follow
this procedure with all of his comments that night. As
Bill Jacob made a presentation and asked some questions
of the mayor, city council and city administrator, Mr.
Christensen sat near the back of the room harassing Mr.
Jacob by stating, "Let's get on with it," "Let someone
else have a chance," "Sit down and shut up." Mr. Jacob
sat down before he was through due to the last comment.
These comments were made at different times and just
loud enough for Mr. Jacob and a few others to hear. A
person at the meeting wrote down what was said by Mr.
Christensen.
Kevin Bennett was seated next to Mr.
Christensen and must have heard what was said.
After
Councilman Brown found out why Mr. Jacob had ended so
abruptly, he tried to address the matter after the
meeting and the next day in city hall.
This is not my attempt to justify George Brown's
actions. I know there have been ongoing problems with
the way Councilman Brown deals with city employees. I
have friends who are city employees.
But Councilman
Brown's actions were not in response to a city employee
voicing legitimate concerns and/or suggestions to the
city council.
George Brown was responding to a city
employee harassing a citizen trying to address the city
council. (Emphasis added.)
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Citizen

Scott Roudabush's statement about Brown's reason for speaking to
Jay Christensen is correct.

The letter also reflects the effects

of the defamation to the reputation of Brown.

[R. 559-560, 615-

616.]
In November 1997, William T. (Bill) Jacob, an American Fork
citizen, made a GRAMA request to the American Fork City Recorder
for the police investigation files about Brown.

The city recorder

provided Jacob a copy of the initial police contact report but did
not

release

statements.
mayor

supplemental

police

report

and

witnesses'

Jacob appealed the partial denial to the mayor.

upheld

supplemental

the

the

denial.

police

report

American
written

Fork
by

Fox

City
and

The

classified

the

the witnesses'

statements as protected documents. [R. 547-551, 558-559.]
Brown

made

a

GRAMA

request

to

American

Fork

City

for

correspondence of which he was the subject that was exchanged with
outside entities such as the Attorney General's Office.

The City

Recorder denied the request and declared a letter from Assistant
Attorney General Stephen H. Morrissett, dated August 4, 1997, to be
a protected record because of attorney-client privilege.
appealed to the Mayor, who did not respond.
appealed to the State Records Committee.

Brown

Subsequently Brown

The Committee upheld the

status that the letter was a protected record. [R. 571-576, 609,
612-613.]
Brown appealed the decision of the State Records Committee to
the Fourth District Court.
Stott.

The case is now assigned to Judge

The letter, dated August 4, 1997, filed in this case as an
14

exhibit to the Affidavit of Morrissett in support of the municipal
employees' Motion for Summary Judgment, is one of the protected
records that Brown sought. [R. 612.]
In November 1998, Marta Murvosh, a reporter for THE DAILY
HERALD, made a GRAMA request to American Fork City.

In response

American Fork City released the supplemental police report of Terry
V. Fox and the Morrissett letter, dated August 4, 1997.
protected records.

Both are

Consequently, the city officials have released

protected documents for publication and some have been filed in
this case. [R. 611.]
Utah

Code Ann., Section

63-2-801, Government

Records

and

Access Management Act, makes it a misdemeanor to release protected
documents.

It appears that officials of American Fork City have

released and published protected records.

[R. 434-435, 451-453,

851, 853-854.]
On January 27, 1999, Judge Howard F. Miatani, Fourth District
Court Judge, signed the following Order of Dismissal With Prejudice
pertaining to the disorderly conduct charge filed by American Fork
City against Brown:
Based upon the Motion of Defendant and good cause
appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED, DECREED AND ORDERED that the
Information against the Defendant in the above captioned
case is hereby Dismissed, with Prejudice, as if the
charge had never been filed as provided in U.C.A.,
Section 77-2-7. [R. 562, 606-607.]
Brown filed a Complaint alleging that the municipal employees
defamed him per se by writing and publishing the grievance to third
parties.

Brown alleged that the municipal employees published the
15

grievance with malice.

The municipal employees filed a motion for

summary judgment with supporting affidavits.
memoranda with supporting affidavits.

Brown filed opposing

There were genuine disputed

material facts identified in the opposing memoranda and supported
by the affidavits. Notwithstanding the disputed material facts, the
trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of the municipal
employees.

[R. 501-622, 631-638, 902-955.]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Clearly, the record

is full of disputed

genuine disputes of material facts.
facts

set

forth

in

the memoranda

facts.

They are

Notwithstanding the disputed
and

affidavits

opposing

the

municipal employees' motion for summary judgment, the trial Court
granted the summary judgment.

The Court of Appeals should reverse

the summary judgment because of the disputed material facts and
remand the case for trial before a jury.
Assuming there were no disputed material facts and the facts
are viewed favorably to Brown, the Court of Appeals must conclude
the municipal employees, in writing the defamatory grievance, acted
with malice in violation of Utah Code Ann., Section 63-30-4, and
they are personally liable for the resulting defamation of Brown.
The Court of Appeals should also rule that, on its face with its
defamatory per se statements, the written grievance

constitutes

legal malice under Utah law.
The municipal

employees

argue

that,

since

they

filed

the

grievance to institute an administrative hearing against Brown, they
are protected by governmental immunity pursuant to Utah Code Ann.,
16

Section 63-30-10.
that

since

Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals should rule

the grievance

did

not

result

in an

administrative

hearing, the municipal employees are not protected by governmental
immunity.

The Court of Appeals should reverse the summary judgment

and remand this case with appropriate instructions for trial before
a jury.
ARGUMENT
I.

IN LIGHT OF GENUINE DISPUTES OF MATERIAL FACTS, THE TRIAL
COURT COMMITTED ERR IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE
APPELLEES/DEFENDANTS.
Rule 56(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, prohibits a trial

court from granting summary judgment if there are disputed material
facts.
(c) . Motion and proceedings
thereon.
. . . The judgment
sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. . . . (Emphasis added.)
As argued before the trial Court, there are genuine issues of
disputed material facts.

Consequently, the trial Court should not

have granted the municipal employees' motion for summary judgment.
A trial court should only grant a summary judgment if there is no
genuine disputed issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Drysdale v. Ford Motor

Co. , 1994 P. 2d 678 (Utah 1997) . Consequently, the Court of Appeals
must remand this case to the trial Court to present the genuine
issues of disputed material facts to the fact finder.
Inasmuch as a challenge to summary judgment presents for review
17

conclusions of law only, because, by definition, summary judgments
do not resolve factual issues, the appellate court reviews those
conclusions for correctness, without according deference to the
trial court's legal conclusions,

Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497

(Utah 1989); Daniels v. Deseret Fed, Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 771 P.2d
1100

(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied,

783 P.2d

53 (Utah 1989);

Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789
P.2d 24 (1990); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Garfield County,
811 P.2d 184 (Utah 1991) .
Summary judgment is a harsh remedy. Consequently, disposition
of a case on summary judgment denies the losing party the benefit
of a trial on the merits.

The appellate court must review the

evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party, and should
affirm only where it appears there is no genuine dispute as to any
material issues of fact, or where, even according to the facts as
contended by the losing party, the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

Themy v. Seagull Enters., Inc., 595

P.2d 526 (Utah 1979); Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281 (Utah Ct. App.
1987); Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance & Furn. Co.,
770 P.2d 88 (Utah 1988); Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764
P.2d 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Hunt v. ESI Eng'g, Inc., 808 P.2d
1137 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied,

826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991).

In determining whether the trial court correctly found that
there were no genuine issues of material fact, the appellate court
views the facts and all reasonable inferences in a light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion.
18

It reviews the trial

Court's conclusions of law for correctness, including its conclusion
that there are no material fact issues. Neiderhauser Bldrs. & Dev.
Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
It only takes one sworn statement to dispute averments on the
other side of controversy and create an issue of fact, precluding
summary judgment.
The presence

of

Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975).
a dispute

as to material

granting of a summary judgment.
562 P. 2d 238 (Utah 1977).

facts

disallows

the

Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abbott,

Brown filed a memorandum, with supporting

affidavits [R. 902-955.], opposing the municipal employees' motion
for summary judgment.

In the memorandum and affidavits opposing the

motion for summary judgment, Brown set forth numerous
facts.

disputed

Many more than just one averment of a single disputed fact.

The order granting summary judgment [R. 129-132.], did not address
all

of

the disputed

facts, but

addressed

only what

the

Court

designated as undisputed facts and ignored the other disputed facts.
The trial Court erred in granting the summary judgment when
there were disputed material facts.

The Court of Appeals should

reverse the summary judgment and remand this case for trial before
a j ury.
II.

THE
RECORD
SUPPORTS
THE
POSITION
THAT
THE
APPELLEES/DEFENDANTS DID WRITE AND PUBLISH THE GRIEVANCE
WITH MALICE AND THAT THE GRIEVANCE DOES CONSTITUTE MALICE
UNDER UTAH LAW.
Since a summary judgment is granted as a matter of law rather

than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial
court's legal conclusions.

Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 751 P.2d
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248 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); and Winegar v. Froerer Corp,, 813 P.2d 104
(Utah 1991).

The appellate court accords no deference to a trial

court's legal conclusions given to support the grant of summary
judgment, but reviews them for correctness.

Schurtz v. BMW of N.

Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991).
In the Order and Summary Judgment entered by the trial Court,
Paragraph 3 of the Conclusions Of Law states as follows:
3.
As a separate and independent ground for
dismissing plaintiff's Complaint against the defendants,
the Court concludes that under Section 63-30-4(3) (b) this
action against the employee defendants is barred, because
there is no evidence in the record that the employee
defendants "acted or failed to act through fraud or
malice." The grievance, on its face, does not constitute
legal malice under Utah law. [R. 1030.]
Malice, in regards to defamation, has been defined as

(1)

knowledge that a statement was false; or (2) reckless disregard of
whether

a

statement

was

true

or

false, which

means

that

the

defendant acted with a high degree of awareness of the probable
falsity of the statement, or that, at the time the statement was
transmitted, the defendant had serious doubts that the statement was
true.

West v. Thomson Newspapers, 188 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (Ct. App.

1992); Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 59 U.S.L.W. 4726, 473
(June 20, 1991); Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, 720 F.2d 631

(11th Cir.

1983) ; Ryan v. Brooks, 634 F.2d 726 (4th Cir. 1980) ; Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d
324, 342

(2d Cir. 1969), cert, denied,

396 U.S. 1049 (1970); St.

Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130 (1967); and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
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254 (1964) .
The grievance, dated July 1, 1997, states on its face that
Brown committed criminal acts.

The grievance states in part as

follows:
. At issue is the assault committed by Councilman
George Brown upon Lieutenant Terry Fox . . . Councilman
Brown then assaulted Lieutenant Fox in an attempt to
intimidate him and control the information release in the
report of disorderly conduct and assaultive behavior by
Brown. . . . We Grieve the fact that Councilman George
Brown has violated Utah Criminal Code 76-9-102-Disorderly
Conduct, 76-5-102.4-Assault against a peace officer, . .
. [R. 3.] .
The grievance states, instead of alleging, on its face that Brown
violated Utah Code Ann., Sections 76-5-102.4 and 76-9-102, and,
therefore, Brown committed the crimes of disorderly conduct and
assault against a peace officer.

These statements, if false, are

defamation per se.
The grievance also states, instead of alleging, on its face
that Brown harassed female employees.

It states in part as follows:

. . . At issue is the fact that Councilman George Brown
has focused his repeated demeaning behavior against
female staff employees of American Fork City. That he
takes pleasure in making ridiculing, demeaning, and
coercing statements towards female staff in an effort to
creat [sic] a hostile, abusive, and intimidating work
environment for them. [R. 2.]
Libel per se has been defined as follows:
A statement is libelous per se if it is comprised of
language which by its nature necessarily must, or
presumably will, as a natural and proximate cause,
occasion pecuniary loss or actual injury whether or not
any such pecuniary loss or actual injury actually
occurred. Actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket
pecuniary loss but may include impairment of reputation
or standing in the community, personal humiliation,
anxiety, shame, mortification, and mental anguish and
suffering.
(Emphasis added.)
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Slander per se has been defined as follows:
For a statement to be slanderous per se,
it must fall
within one of the following four categories: (1) a charge
that the plaintiff is guilty of criminal conduct; (2) a
charge that the plaintiff suffers from a loathsome
disease; (3) a charge that the plaintiff is guilty of
conduct that is incompatible with the exercise of lawful
business, tradef profession, or office; and (4) a charge
that the plaintiff, if a woman, is guilty of unchastity.
(Emphasis added.)
Allred v. Cook, 590 P.2d 318 (Utah 1979); Western States Title Ins.
Co. v, Warnock, 18 Utah 2d 70, 415 P.2d 316 (1966) ; Nichols v. Daily
Reporter Co. , 30 Utah 74, 83 P. 573 (1905); and Gertz v. Welch, 418
U.S. 323 (1974) .
On July 1, 1997, the date of the grievance, Brown had not been
charged with any violation of criminal statutes.
American

Fork

infraction.
against

City

charged

Brown

with

Subsequently,

disorderly

conduct,

an

American Fork City never charged Brown with assault

a police

officer.

However, the Court

dismissed,

prejudice, the charge of disorderly conduct, an infraction.

with
These

facts were in the record before the trial Court at the time he
granted the summary judgment. [R.562-563, 606-607, 931.]
Brown filed a Complaint and an Amended Complaint that stated
the municipal employees had defamed him per se and that they acted
with malice.
supported

[R. 1-12, 13-36.]

He also filed affidavits

that

the position that the municipal employees acted with

malice. [R. 917-955.]
A.

Municipal employees are personally liable for malice.

The Utah Supreme Court has addressed municipal employees being
liable for fraud or malice.

DeBrv v.Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 1995 Utah
22

LEXIS 4

(Utah 1995); Maddocks v. Salt Lake Corp., 740 P.2d 1337

(Utah 1987); and Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983).
Madsen, 658 P.2d at 632-633, states as follows:
He [governmental employee] cannot be sued in his personal
capacity because § 63-30-4 precludes personal liability
of a government employee for acts or omissions occurring
during the performance of his duties, unless the employee
"acted or failed to act through gross negligence, fraud
or malice." Since plaintiffs' complaint makes no such
allegations, its dismissal as to defendant Borthick was
proper, (Emphasis added.)
DeBrv v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 1995 LEXIS 4 (Utah 1995) states
as follows:
Thus, even though the governmental agency cannot be
liable, an employee who commits fraud in the course of
his employment can be held personally liable. See Madsen
I, 658 P.2d at 632-33; Maddocks v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
740 P.2d 1337, 1339-40 (Utah 1987). (Emphasis added.)
If an employee can be personally liable for fraud, she can also
be personally liable for malice. Brown alleged in the Complaint and
the Amended Complaint that the municipal employees acted through
malice. Moreover, the motions also clearly addressed malice. Brown
introduced malice to the Court.

Indeed, the trial Court made a

ruling on the issue of malice.

This is one of the main issues

before this appellate court.

The Court of Appeals should provide

a ruling that municipal employees can be liable for malice.
B.

Innocent until proven guilty.

Utah Code Ann., Section 76-1-501 states in part as follows:
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is
presumed to be innocent until each element of the offense
charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
In absence of such proof, the defendant shall be
acquitted.
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Brown was, by law, presumed to be innocent of all criminal charges
until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Two of the people

signing the grievance and parties to this case, Terry Fox and Gary
Caldwell, are members of the American Fork Police Department, and
Fox was

a

lieutenant.

These police

officers

confidentiality as established by GRAMA.

have

a duty of

They also should be aware

of an accused's presumption of innocence.
The contrast of the provisions of Section 76-1-501 to the
brass, bold statements on the face of the grievance that Brown
committed

crime

is sufficient

employees acted with malice.

to establish

that

the

municipal

Utah Code Ann., Section 63-30-4 does

not protect the municipal employees if they act with malice, even
if the municipality could not be liable.
C.

Protected records released to news media and
the Court.

Included in the record is the news article that was published
in The Salt

Lake

Tribune

on July 4, 1997. [R. 921-922.]

The article

makes reference to police reports and statements of the witnesses.
These reports and statements are protected documents pursuant to the
Government Records Access and Management Act

(GRAMA), Utah Code

Ann., Section 63-2-304. Other members of the news media stated that
they received protected records from American Fork City about the
criminal investigation against Brown. [R. 613, 615, 635.]
The police reports and the witness statements were protected
records.

William T. Jacob made a GRAMA request for the police to

investigation records about Brown.

American Fork City denied his

request pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 63-2-304(9) . [R.558, 63424

635.]

Nevertheless, the records found their way into the hands of

the news media.

There is a record that the American Fork Police

Department faxed the police investigation files to the Salt
Tribune.

[R. 578, 615, 635.]

Four

Lake

protected records were filed in

this case: the August 7, 1997 correspondence of Assistant Attorney
General Stephen Morrissett, the supplemental police report of Terry
Fox,

the

witness

statement

of

Carl

Wanlass,

and

the

witness

statement of Jay Christensen. [R. 434-435, 451-453, 851, 853-854.]
Release of these records could result in criminal sanctions pursuant
to Utah Code Ann., Section 63-2-801, for the party who released the
records.

Potentially

criminal

behavior

certainly

demonstrates

malice.
All of this information is in the record and was before the
trial Court when he made the decision to grant summary judgment
against Brown.

There is adequate evidence before the Court of

Appeals to determine that the trial Court erred in holding that the
grievance on it face did not demonstrate malice.
D.

View facts favorable to Appellant/Plaintiff.

On review of a summary judgment, the party against whom the
judgment

has

presented,

been

and

all

granted
the

is

entitled

inferences

to

fairly

considered in a light most favorable to him.

have

all

arising

the

facts

therefromf

Morris v. Farnsworth

Motel, 123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297 (1953); Young v. Texas Co. , 8 Utah
2d 206, 331 P.2d 1099 (1958); Brandt v. Springville Banking Co., 10
Utah 2d 350, 353 P.2d 460 (1960); Bridge v. Backman, 10 Utah 2d 366,
353 P.2d 909 (1960); Allen's Prods. Co. v. Glover, 18 Utah 2d 9, 414
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P.2d 93 (1966); Pioneer Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Pioneer Fin. & Thrift
Co., 18 Utah 2d 106, 417 P.2d 121 (1966); Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H
Ins. Co., 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986); Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16
Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62 (1964); Whitman v. W.T. Grant Co., 16 Utah
2d 81, 395 P.2d 918 (1964); English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989), aff'd, 848 P.2d 153 (Utah 1993); Mountain States
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184 (Utah 1991);
Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991).
In considering an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the
appellate court views the facts in a light most favorable to the
losing party below.

In determining whether those facts require, as

a matter of law, the entry of judgment for the prevailing party
below, the appellate court gives no deference to the trial court's
conclusions of law, which are reviewed for correctness. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989).
III. THE
APPELLEES/DEFENDANTS
DID
NOT
INSTITUTE
AN
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING THEREFORE THEY DO NOT HAVE
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY.
The memorandum, dated July 2, 1997, from Carl Wanlass to the
Governing Body, City Recorder, and City Attorney (Civil) [R.926.],
states as follows:
Attached is a copy of a grievance letter addressed to
myself. What direction should be pursued in this matter
is unchartered in that to my knowledge the city has never
been faced to address an issue such as the one presented.
Under the city's personnel policy grievance matters are
directed through the City Recorders [sic] Office,
however, I don't personally believe that this is
applicable in this situation. I am therefore, requesting
that the City's Recorder and Attorney (Civil) do some
research and advice [sic] the Governing Body and myself
accordingly.
If ethically or legally there is [sic]
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certain procedures the City must follow the City will
comply, otherwise I assume disposition of this matter
would be at the discretion [sic] of the Governing Body.
Thereafter on July 8, 1997, Kevin Bennett, the city attorney
for

civil

matters,

in response

to

the memorandum

of Wanlass,

presented his attorney's opinion [R. 924.], in which Bennett stated
as follows:
. . our [American Fork City's] personnel policies do
not apply to members of the governing body.
Councilmen, then, are exempted from the nonexempt
personnel policy (and thus not covered thereby); and are
not included in the coverage of the exempt personnel
policy.
Neither applies — which includes any grievance
procedure set forth thereunder.
The governing body did not take any action.
administrative hearing.

The municipal employees did not institute

a formal grievance hearing.
administrative

There was no

proceeding

There was no authority to initiate an
pursuant

to

the

American

Fork

City

Personnel Policies and Procedures. There are no state statutes that
give

the

municipal

employees

the

authority

to

initiate

administrative hearing to grieve their concerns about Brown.

an
A

governmental official with authority to initiate an administrative
had to act to institute a hearing.

There was no authority to

institute an administrative hearing.

Consequently, the municipal

employees did not institute an administrative hearing.
In the absence of the criteria for immunity of instituting an
administrative hearing, the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code
Ann., Section 63-3-10, cannot apply.

The municipal employees are

liable for their actions if they act with malice.

Therefore, the

municipal employees are liable for their defamation of Plaintiff,
27

pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 63-30-4.
The Court of Appeals must view the facts favorable to Brown.
When the facts are viewed favorably to Brown, it is obvious that the
municipal employees did not institute an administrative hearing;
notwithstanding their desire to institute a hearing.

In the absence

of an administrative hearing, the Court of Appeals should hold that
the municipal employees do not have governmental immunity.
CONCLUSION
The

Court

of Appeals

should

reverse

the

summary

judgment

granted by the trial Court and remand this case, with instructions
that municipal employees can be liable for malice, to a jury for
trial.

The Court of Appeals should also award costs to Brown.
Respectfully submitted this S\

day of April, 2000.

G'eorge <B. Brown, Jur.
Appellant/Plaintiff
Attorney Pro Se
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, George E. Brown, Jr., certify that on the ^
day of
April, 2 0 00, I served two (2) copies of the BRIEF OF APPELLANT
GEORGE E. BROWN, JR., to Andrew M. Morse, the Counsel for the
Appellees in this matter, by mailing them to him first class mail
with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address:
Andrew M. Morse
Heather S. White
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorneys for Appellees/Defendants

George £) Brown,
Appellant/Plaintiff
Attorney Pro Se

GEB\DEFAME\APPEAL\BRIEF
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ADDENDUM
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Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
ANDREW M. MORSE (A4498)
HEATHER S. WHITE (A7674)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants Wanlass, Hansen,
Caldwell, Walker, Thomas, Smith and Fox
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Fax No.: (801)363-0400

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE E. BROWN, JR.,
Plaintiff,

ORDER AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
CARL WANLASS, DEBBIE HANSEN,
GARY CALDWELL, CINDY WALKER,
SHAUNA THOMAS, KEN SMITH,
TERRY V. FOX, MARTA MURVOSH,
MICHAEL PATRICK, THE DAILY
HERALD, a corporation, and THE
PULITZER COMMUNITY
NEWSPAPERS, INC., a corporation,
and JOHN DOES 1 through 75,

Civil No. 980404712
Judge Gary D. Stott

Defendants.

On August 13,1999, the Court heard argument on defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment. Andrew M. Morse, of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, appeared for the defendants

Carl Wanlass, Debbie Hansen, Gary Caldwell, Cindy Walker, Shauna Thomas, Ken Smith,
Terry V. Fox, and Karen M. Siirola appeared as co-counsel for plaintiff, attorney George E.
Brown, Jr. The Court reviewed the memoranda and affidavits, and heard arguments of counsel.

UNDISPUTED FACTS
In addition to the undisputed facts set forth in the defendants' Memorandum supporting
their Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court determines that the following facts are undisputed:
1.

Defendants Carl Wanlass, Debbie Hansen, Gary Caldwell, Cindy Walker, Shauna

Thomas, Ken Smith, Terry V. Fox at all relevant times were employees of American Fork City
Incorporated, a Utah governmental entity.
2.

In July 1997, the defendant employees, along with 37 others, signed a grievance

concerning plaintiff.
3.

Each statement in the grievance concerned matters relating exclusively to the

defendants' employment.
4.

Each statement in the grievance raised concerns of the defendants solely in their

capacities as employees of American Fork City.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Based on these undisputed facts, the Court concludes, as a matter of law, that three
separate and independent provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act bar plaintiffs claims
against the defendants.

-2-

1.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) (1953, as amended) bars claims arising out of

"libel, slander, abuse of process" and "infliction of mental anguish." This provision bars both
Count 1 (Defamation) and Count 2 (Intentional infliction of Emotional Distress) of plaintiffs
Complaint.
2.

As a separate and independent ground for dismissing plaintiffs claims against the

defendants, the Court concludes that the grievance was the initiation of an administrative
proceeding against the plaintiff and consequently, the defendants are immune under § 63-3-10(5),
which bars claims arising out of "the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative
proceeding, even if malicious or without probable causes."
3.

As a separate and independent ground for dismissing plaintiffs Complaint against

the defendants, the Court concludes that under § 63-30-4(3)(b) this action against the employee
defendants is barred, because there is no evidence in the record that the employee defendants
"acted or failed to act through fraud or malice." The grievance, on its face, does not constitute
legal malice under Utah law.
The Court concludes that fraud was not pled within the requirements of Rule 9(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as the elements and circumstances constituting fraud were not
stated with particularity. Any allegation of fraud, therefore, fails as a matter of law.

-3-

ORDER
For these reasons, as well as those stated in the defendants' Motion and Memoranda, the
Court grants the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and dismisses the plaintiffs claims
with prejudice and on the merit.
DATED this

^

day of-^ttjgsr, 1999.
BY THE COURT

By:
Gary D. Stott</District Court Judge
t" "

Approved as to Form:

George E. Brown, Jr.
Attorney Pro Se

Karen M. Siirola
Co-counsel for Plaintiff

N \19491\3\MC\ORDER MSJ
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AMERICAN FORK CITY
OFFICE OF THE CITY ADMINISTRATE^£
801-763-3000
C ^ ^ ' C o ^
MEMORANDUM
TO:
DATE:

Deputy

GOVERNING BODY, CITY RECORDER, CITY ATTORNEY
(CIVIL).
JULY 2, 1997

SUBJECT: 'GRIEVANCE LETTER
Attached is a copy of a grievance letter addressed to
myself. What direction should be pursued in this
matter is uncharted in that to my knowledge the city
has never been faced to address an issue such as the
one presented.
Under the city's personnel policy grievance matters are
directed through the City Recorders Office, however, I
don't personally believe-that this is applicable in
this situation. I am therefore, requesting that the
City's Recorder and Attorney (Civil) do some research
and advice the Governing Body- and myself accordingly.
If ethically or legally there is certain procedures the
City must follow the City will comply, otherwise I
assume disposition of this matter would be at the
discreation of the Governing Body.
Carl T. Wanlass, CPA
City Administrator
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To: Carl Wanlass

From: American Fork City Employees, Departments in Ghnefel \l Q0 PU tnn
Date: July 1,1997
RE: Grievance
This memo is forwarded with the intent to pursue resolution by grievance the following
matters:
At issue is the matter of Councilman George Brown violating employees rights to
freedom of speech in that he did threaten and intimidate an employee of American Fork
City for exercising his right as a citizen to voice an opinion in an open City Council
meeting. That in doing so BROWN has created a hostile environment for all city
employees who would comment on city issues in open forum where opinions over such
matters are invited from the public and other interested parties. That all city employees
must now be fearful of retaliation for expressing their views and beliefs in invited open
forum if those views and beliefs are contrary to those held by Councilman George
Brown.
At issue is the assault committed by Councilman George Brown upon Lieutenant Terry
Fox pursuant to an investigation Lieutenant Fox had undertaken concerning the
disorderly conduct of George Brown on 6/25/97 in American Fork City Hall. George
Brown had attempted to "browbeat" and incite confrontation with American Fork City
Employees in a public place. When he attempted to coerce an employee into giving a
statement to police that was favorable to Brown, Lieutenant Fox rightly corrected
Brown, advising Brown not to tell the employee what to write in the statement.
Councilman Brown then assaulted Lieutenant Fox in an attempt to intimidate him and
control the information release in the report of disorderly conduct and assaultive
behavior by Brown. At issue is the fact that ail American Fork City Employees must
now be fearful of assaultive behavior from Councilman George Brown if their views and
actions are contrary to the views and beliefs of George Brown.
At issue is the repeated threats of termination from employment of American Fork City
Employees by Councilman George Brown. On numerous occasions George Brown has
threatened termination of employment or has told employees to "resign" because the
employee has disagreed with Browns opinions, views; or politics.
Further, Brown has repeatedly violated American Fork Policy and Procedure
concerning personnel problems. Brown has repeatedly degraded, embarrassed,
demeaned, and insulted American Fork City employees in open public forum, in public
places, and in front of fellow city workers exposing American Fork City employees to
public humiliation and contempt.
FYHTRTT A

At issue is the fact that Councilman George Brown has focused his repeated
demeaning behavior against female staff employees of American Fork City. That he
takes pleasure in making ridiculing, demeaning, and coercing statements towards
female staff in an effort to creat a hostile, abusive, and intimidating work environment
for them.
We, therefore, issue complaint, and grieve the above listed issues and seek relief under
section IX of American Fork City Policy and Procedure. We Grieve the fact that
Councilman George Brown has violated Utah Criminal Code 76-9-102- Disorderly
Conduct, 76-5-102.4- Assault against a peace officer, and American Fork City Policy
and Procedures Section VII (C)(2)- Indulging in Offensive Conduct.
Expected Resolution: We demand that American Fork City Councilman George
Brown be reprimanded by the body of City Council. That he be advised that his
conduct has adversely affected the efficiency, harmony, and good order of American
Fork City employees, and that his actions could reasonably cause the public to lose
confidence in American Fork City Government We demand that American Fork City
Councilman George Brown, when acting in his capacity as a representative of American
Fork City government, be courteous and civil with the public and American Fork City
Employees. That he not use abusive, indecent, course, harsh, loud, or profane
language in any public place, and shall not expose City employees to public humiliation
and contempt. That he refrain from physically assaultive and intimidating behavior.
This Complaint and Grievance in no way limits individual persons from seeking redress
br damages, civil and criminal, against George Brown.

/w^vC

(Citg (Souncil

J W r t a m Jffnrk ffltig

RICKY STORRS
GEORGE E. BROWN
JOHN McKINNEY
GRANT PARKER
CLARK TAYLOR

^Incorporate Junr A, 1853
S t a i r of

CARL T. WANLASS. CPA.
City Administrator
RICHARD M. COLBORN, Recorder
PAMELA D. HUNSAKER, Treasurer
JO>(IN DURRANT, Chief of Police
HOWARD DENNEY, City Engineer
TUCKER HANSEN, City Attorney Crii
KEVIN BENNETT, City Attorney Civtf

liinl]

JESS GREEN, MAYOR

31 JJortfj Cfjurcf; Street
American Jorfc. Wlafi $4003
(SOiJ 7*53-3000

JulyS, 1997

Memo to City Recorder
From City Attorney (Civil).

#

RE: Grievance against Councilman Brown
<

1. You requested an opinion as to whether or not the City's personnel policies applied to Councilman
Brown and the processing of the grievance recently brought against him by a number of City employees
(including referral of the grievance to an appeals board).
2. I have reviewed the grievance, as well as our personnel policies, and am of the opinion that our
personnel policies do not apply to members of the governing body.
a. The nonexempt personnel policy specifically exempts from its application a number of
persons or groups of persons, including-first of all-elected officials.
b. Looking to the exempt personnel policy, then, I find that it lists those specifically covered by
the exempt personnel policy. Conspicuously absent is any reference to elected officials.
c. Counciimen, then, are exempted from the nonexempt personnel policy (and thus not covered
thereby); and are not included in the coverage of the exempt personnel policy. Neither applies-which
includes any grievance procedure set forth thereunder.
d. That makes sense-inasmuch as an appeals board comprised of employees and officials would
lack the power to take disciplinary action against a Councilman. At best, even if one of the respective
personnel policies indicated that it did apply to grievances against members of the City Council, it would
seem that the only thing such an appeals board could do would be to recommend action to the City
Council-the only City entity that could take any action, however limited, on such a grievance.
e. It appears that referral to a board established by an inapplicable personnel policy and lacking
the power to impose sanctions against elected officials is neither contemplated nor necessary.
3. Due to a possible conflict of interest in this matter,.however, I refrain from providing advice as to
how the grievance should or might be handled by the City.
cc: Mayor, City Council, and Citv AdminiQtratnr

Letters to the editor
About those , comments ,
Editor:
A couple of things concern me. I tlunk it
is important to identify the reason
Councilman Blown approached city
employees on June 25 about Jay
Christensen's "comments" during the council meeting from the night before. And the
idea that because the city council is made
up of elected officials they have carte
blanche to vote however they want is ludicrous. It has been made to look like Mr.
Cliristensen was being attacked by
Councilman Brown for voicing lus opinion
as a citizen and city employee, but that's
not exactly'what the issue was the night of
the meeting.
First, as citizens of American Fork we
all have an interest in the way the mayor,
city council and city employees make decisions and spend the taxpayers* money and
other revenue that is supposed to benefit
the city and its citizens.
City officials and employees have a special interest in certain actions that can be
taken by the mayor and city, council as it
will directly affect their working environment and/or wages they earn.
If they support each other in their pursuits, whether those pursuits are fiscally
responsible or not, then they all benefit. .
I'm not implying that the citizens
wouldn't benefit from some of those pursuits, but city officials and employees
receive additional benefits And remember,
the mayor and city council vote and
approve expenditures, and the city employees provide at least 600-plus votes in city
elections.
In the city council meeting held on June
24, 1997. not all of the citizens in atten-
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dance followed rules of order. There are
rules of order to follow when making comments .and suggestions. Jay Christen6en
did not follow this procedure with all of lus
comments that night. As Bill Jacob made a
presentation and asked some questions of
the mayor, city council and city administrator, Mr. Christensen sat near the back of
the room harassing Mr. Jacob by stating,
"Let's get on with it," "Let someone else
have a chance/*"Sit down and shut up." Mr.
Jacob sat down before he was through due
to the last comment.
These comments were made at different
times and just loud enough for Mr. JacoB^
and a few others to hear. A person at the
meeting wrote down what was said by Mr.
Cliristensen. Kevin Bennett was seated
next to Mr. Cliristensen and must have
heard what was said. After Councilman
Brown'found out why Mr. Jacob had ended
so abruptly, he tried to address the matter
after the meeting and the next day in city
hall.
Tlus is not my attempt to justify George
Brown's actions. I know there have been
ongoing
problems . with
the
way
Councilman Brown deals with city employees. I have friends who are city employees.
But Councilman Brown's actions were'not
in response to a city employee voicing legitimate concerns and/or suggestions to the
city council. George Brown was responding
to a city employee harassing a citizen trying to address the city council.
My other issue is the attitude some of
the councilmen have taken concerning
their elected official status. The majority of
the city council has supported bonding that
would not need to be brought to a bond
election for the city's involvement in the
Woodbury Project near K-MarL_Their

rationale has been that they were elected
to act for the citizens of American Fork, so
a bond election isn't necossary. Yes, you
have been elected to act for the City of
American Fork and its citizens, but you
have not been elected to act without regard
to the citizens' opinions and concerns. I
appreciate the fact they changed their
minds on the other four land and building
issues, but it appears a few of them
reversed their direction only after they felt
politically threatened.
Good government is usunlly responsive
to its citizens and operates in the open. I
know we should be moving forward, but
until the city council quits adhering to the
letter of the law only, and begins to follow
the 6pirit and intent of the law also, then
issues like these will continue to occur and
be a problem.
,
—Scott Roudabush

top, councilman cl
merican Fork police officer felt 'threatenec ' by Brown
By BEKKI JANSON
The Daily Herald

" E R I C A N FORK — Lt.
Fox of the American Fork
ce D e p a r t m e n t h a s filed
ult against American Fork
icilman George Brown.
le
alleged
incident
rred
Wednesday
after
^n and Fox got into a heatscussion over the handling'
separate assault case.
started to walk away, and
n reached out with his
hand and grabbed me by
iceps on the left a r m and
ted
me
the s a m e
, stopping
moveFox said
ieport on
icident. "I
lireatened
lis point
Brown
going to G e o r g e B r o w n
lue the assault on me."
t Brown, an attorney, sees
erently. He says the physmtact was minute.
i were all s t a n d i n g close
h t h a t anybody could

h a v e reached out to touch
someone else," Brown said.
"When he (Fox) moved towards
me, I p u t my hand up and it Continued from A l
touched his shoulder. That's all a t t e s t e d Brown on the spot, he
there was to it."
said he decided to let the counAlthough Fox wasn't in uniform a t the time, Brown said he cilman walk away.
"As an officer of the peace,
wasn't about to challenge someyou have to make a decision to
one who was armed.
Two other people were pre- file a report or make a physical
sent; J a s o n
Peterson,
an at rest," Fox said. "If it was anyAmerican Fork police officer, one else I would have arrested
and J a y Cfyristihsen, American them, but he is a councilman.
T v e never had anything to
Fork Oity*erh&£gency services
do
with him. I was sent there as
director. Chrfstehsen placed the
part
of my job. This is the first
call th'at brougltt Fox a n d
time
I've had a confrontation
Pet&B0Art0%h'e scene.
with Brown."
Both
Christensen
ana
Still, the incident surprises
P e t e r s o n agree w i t h Fox's Mayor J e s s Green — no
(I&s^rlbtion of the incident.
stranger to controversy himself.
/*ttfmA report about t h e inciGreen and the city council
$ 3 1 $ p e r s o n said the alleged have been a t odds over a numa s s a u l t occurred when Brown ber of issues, including the
wallc^cl toward C h r i s t e n s e n mayor's writing of a letter on
a n d y b x stepped between them., city stationery asking a judge
P e t e r s o n said Brown t h e n for leniency on behalf of a
grabbed Fox by the a r m to push d r u n k driver.
"It is very unusual to file a
him but of the way. j U t h a t
grievance
of this nature," Green
point, Fox told Brown not^ to
said. "1 have : ver witnessed
touch h i m or" he] would be a n y t h i n g of this n a t u r e by
arrested, Peterson said.
' councilman Brown."
A l t h o u g h Fox could h a v e
Wednesday's
incident
temmed from a series of conSee CLASH, A8 versations Brown had at City
Hall with several city employees regarding his treatment of

CLASH

Christensen said he walked
in on a discussion between
Brown and Cindy Walker, a city
employee. C h r i s t e n s e n said
Brown then questioned him
about Christensen's remarks a t
the council meeting the previous night.
During the discussion, City
A d m i n i s t r a t o r Carl Wanless
walked over and asked Brown
not to bother the staff. After
Brown went to a different area
of the building, Christensen
then made the call to the police
department.
"Between his being loud and
my being loud in a public building. Wanless came to ask
Geoi/,'e not to bother the staff,"
Christensen said. "Brown told
Wanless to make him, and I
t h o u g h t something physical
was going to happen so I went
into the office and called the
police."
Christensen
waited
for
police to arrive. He was talking
with Fox and Peterson outside
City Hall when Brown walked
up and joined the conversation.
Brown inquired about filing
an a s s a u l t report against
Wanless for his previous behavior in City Hall. According to all
reports and an affidavit written
by Brown, police told Brown to

Moments later, Brown <
Christensen to file a repc
what he had seen in City
but Fox told Brown not to
ence Christensen and \vh
might write in his report.
It was at t h a t point tha
alleged a s s a u l t occurred.
The charges are being ii
tigated by the Utah Co
Sheriff's Office. Possible pt
ties will be addressed aftei
investigation is complete.
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Councilman Accused of Assaulting Cop
In Ruckus at American Fork City Hall
ed inappropriately or even raised his voice
during
the incident, and claimed reports to
THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE
the contrary are being trumped up to disAMERICAN FORK — So much for civili- credit him and divert attention from ongoty.
ing city controversies.
Just six weeks after the city's fractious
"This is all part of a grand setup," said
government pledged to get along better, Brown, the only councilman to takje Mayor
Councilman George Brown, the embattled Jess Green's side in his year-old feud with
mayor's lone ally-on the City Council, has the city's Poljce Department.
been accused of assaulting a police officer,
According to Jay Chnstensen, the city's
throwing a City Hall tantrum and brow- ambulance captain, Brown confronted him
beating city employees.
June 25 at City Hall and loudly berated him
A formal grievance, signed by more than^ for speaking up in the previous nightjs City
three dozen city employees, has been filed~ Council meeting. "He started pointing finwith City Administrator Carl Wanlass ask- gers at me and said, 'You have no right to
ing that the councilman be reprimanded make derogatory statements in a fCity
for a June 24 disturbance at American Council meeting,' " Christensen said
Fork's City Hall in which police were sum- Thursday.
moned. And a police report has been forWhen Wanlass approached and told
warded to the Utah County Attorney's Office for investigation.
Brown denied Thursday that he ever actSee AMERICAN FORK, Page B-3
BY PHIL MILLER

American Fork
Councilman
Denies Assault
• Contimied'fromtB-1
Brown to stopryelling*atpity employees, , .Christensen recounted,
"Brown said, ''Why don't you,
make me.1'. . . He^just lost it. I
felt threatened;and thought possiblyUhere "would'be some'physical things going on." He called police.
But Brown, who saidihe simply
was asking Christensen not to
mutter insults that could intimidate -residents^'during .'meetings,
asserted. that "Wanlass' was Uhe
threatening1 one.'
"Carl [Wanlass] told Jay [Christensen] not to talk.to me, but I told
him I could talk,to-any city employee. He'[Wanlass]'came down
the stairs and'walked very>menacingly.toward,me;n said the,councilman. "J-.<could see' he was extremelyangry."
Christenserflef tand was met on
the sidewalk .by police Lt. Terry
Fox, who.-asked.him what was
happening.,Moments later,.Brown
left City.Hall'andiapproached the
men, by then joined by police Officer Jason Petersen.
According to Foxls police -report filed^ that* afternoon, Brown
started to tell Christensen what to
putin his'statement to poUce, until Fox interrupted and told Christensen togo to.the Police«Department. When.Fox started;to walk
away, he said, Brown grabbed him
by the armband ..pushed•*him
around;sotthey were facing.again.
'T-.thoughts IHere* he^comes.
This,,was<a man-who.was-out of
control,' " ,Fox said, Thursday.
"That's-an assault. That's-when
you make an arrest and put him in
handcuffs.",
Instead, ,,Fox!'s police report
said, he ordered Brownto,let him
go and never touch him again.
"J could tell.by the look on„his
face he realized,he-had assaulted
a police; officer," Fox said. "His
face;went .white, like 4Oh, what
have I done?'"
Brown denied ever grabbing

the police lieutenant. H e . - Fox
lunged at him while he talked to
Christensen. Brown ,saw the
movement out of the corner of ;his
eye^ and,instinctively .put 'up" his
opVn leftt ha'nd to" avoid contact,
the;councilman said. In.doing so,
Brown said, he barely brushed the
officer's shoulder.
"I was not disrespectful/1 did
not grip him, I used an open hand
and it was a very light touch,"
Brown said. "He responded" in a
very threatening voice, 'Don't
ever touch me again/ . . . I had
the distinct impression that„,he
desperately wanted to harm me."
That's because, the councilman
said, he has called for an independent investigation of the Police
Department and backed Green's
attempt to fire Police Chief John
Durrant.
Fox denied that, saying he*simply.responded to a report of a disturbance.
He and Petersen filed their reports and sent them to City Attorney! Kevin Bennett, who forwarded them to the County Attorney's
Office.
A formal grievance, signed by
about 40 city employees, was filed
with Wanlass on Tuesday, alleging that Brown's conduct violated
free-speech rights by intimidating
employees, that he has threatened
to fire employees /who disagree
with him, and that he "has repeatedly degraded, embarrassed, demeaned and insulted American.
Fork employees in public places."
Wanlass would not comment on
the grievance, but said he had forwarded it to Mayor Green and the.
council.
It's all groundless nonsense,
Brown said, and is intended to
shift the city's focus from the
council's ongoing debate about
where to locate a new City'Hall
Wanless, 'Brown said, is orehestratingvan-attemptto buy land on
the city's.west edge withoutunput
from the public or Green.
"This is the time to bring it to a
decision, and Carl perceives-that
I'm in his way," Brown said.
Christensen disagreed, saying
the issue is Brown's alleged bullying.
"He should be reprimanded, at
least," Christensen said. "I didn't
sign the grievance, but I intend to
write abetter of support."
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NO.
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233

DATE

JUL
JUL
JUL
JUL
JUL
JUL
JUL
JUL
JUL
JUL
JUL
JUL
JUL
JUL
JUL
JUL
JUL
JUL
JUL
JUL
JUL
JUL
JUL
JUL
JUL
JUL
JUL

11
11
13
14
14
14
16
16
16
16
16
17
18
21
21
21
22
24
28
28
28
28
29
29
30
30
31

TIME

TO PLACE

WENDOVER UT
ST GEORGE UT
LOGAN UT
MURRAY UT
ST GEORGE UT
LOGAN UT
EPHRAIM UT
KEARNS UT
3: U P SALT LAKE UT
8:33P DRAPER UT
9: 10P TOOELE UT
12:05P SALT LAKE UT
2:46P HELPER UT
9:50A MURRAY UT
9:52A MIDVALE UT
7:01P MIDVALE UT
2:06P COTTONWOOD UT
12:02A LOGAN UT
10:44A LEEDS UT
10:59A SALT LAKE UT
12:46P SALT LAKE UT
1:52P HOLLADAY UT
1: 13P LOGAN UT
7 :54P FARMINGTON UT
10 : 12A SALT LAKE UT
9 :57P TOOELE UT
3 •09P CLEARFIELD UT
10:35A
12: 18P
5:42P
10:49A
2:44P
3: 12P
9:26A
12:58P

TO AREA NUMBER

801
801
801
801
801
801
801
801
801
801
801
801
801
801
801
801
801
801
801
801
801
801
801
801
801
801
801

TYPE

D
665-2226
634-5860
D
755-7104
E
288-8255
D
688-2527
D
755-7104
D
283-7020
D
963-3307
D
977-3796
D
E
495-1782
E
882-5600
D
974-7707
472-8888
D
262-5813
D
567-7270
D
569-2560
E
943-9105
D
755-2578
N
879-2087
D
D
355-0781
D
248-7595
278-5700
D
750-7409
D
E
451-4568
248-7595
D
843-2140
E
D
777-1522
SUBTOTAL

MJNUTES

6

AMOUNT

1
5
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
6
7
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
15
13
1
1
4
113

10.55

.72
.58

. 19

.97
.21
.29
. 19
. 19
. 19

.14
. 14

.49
.57
. 14
. 19

.29
.. 14

.08
. 14
. 10
. 19

.29
. 14
. 14
2.92
1.42
. 14

.08
.78

CALL;J

FROM 763- 3030
8. 56A SALT LAKE UT
8. 46A SALT LAKE UT
SALT LAKE UT
_^236_ JUL -21"JTJT"03 3. 26P SALT LAKE UT
— T238
S T JUL 08 10. 49A KEARNS UT
239 JUL 08 2. 17P SALT LAKE UT
240 JUL 09 9 10A HURRICANE UT
241 JUL 09 3 07P DRAPER UT
242 JUL 11 9: 12A SALT LAKE UT
243 JUL 11 9 38A SALT LAKE UT
244 JUL 15 2. 31P ST GEORGE UT
245 JUL 16 11 30A SALT LAKE UT
246 JUL 16 3: 35P SALT LAKE UT
247 JUL 16 4: 57P SALT LAKE UT
248 JUL 17 9: 50A SALT LAKE UT
249 JUL 17 11: 52A SALT LAKE UT
250 JUL 18 3: 07P LOGAN UT
251 JUL 18 3: 08P LOGAN UT
252 JUL 18 3: 10P LOGAN UT
253 JUL 18 3: 12P LOGAN UT
254 JUL 18 3: 12P LOGAN UT
255 JUL 18 5: 56P HEBER CITY UT
256 JUL 22 2: 17P KEARNS UT
257 JUL 22 2: 18P KEARNS UT
258 JUL 22 2: 19P KEARNS UT
259 JUL 22 2: 20P KEARNS UT
260 JUL 22 4: 07P MURRAY UT
261 JUL 22 4: 10P KEARNS UT
262 JUL 22 4: 21P SALT LAKE UT
263 JUL 22 4: 26P SALT LAKE UT
264 JUL 22 4: 29P SALT LAKE UT
265 JUL 23 10: 35A SALT LAKE UT
266 JUL 28 8: 52A MURRAY UT
267 JUL 28 3: 44P SALT LAKE UT
268 JUL 29 6: 48A PARK CITY UT
269 JUL 29 10: 57A SALT LAKE UT
270 JUL 30 9: 36A SALT LAKE UT

234
235

JUL 02
JUL 03

801 297-3578
801 537-5630

D
D

5
4

801 521-9418.
8TTTTB1P5296
801 965-4619
801 537-5630
801 635-0620
801 572-3706
801 297-3578
801 972-6029
801 634-5742
801 297-3578
801 584-8435
801 584-8435
801 486-8815
B01 584-8435
801 755-7104
801 755-7104
801 755-7104
801 755-7104
801 755-7104
801 654-2947
801 957-3205
801 957-3205
801 957-3848
801 957-3848
801 288-5357
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Rule 56. Summary judgment.
Rules Text
(a)
For claimant.
A party seeking to recover upon a claim f
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment
may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary
judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part
thereof.
(b)
For defending
party.
A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment
is sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any
part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings
thereon.
The motion, memoranda and
affidavits shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501.
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory
in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully
adjudicated
on motion.
If on motion under
this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all
the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing
of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before
it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain
what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what
material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear
without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the
amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and
directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon
the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits;
further testimony; defense required.
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an
affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court
may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions,
answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion
€> 2000 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., one of the LEXIS Publishing™ companies Allrightsreserved.

2
for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against
him.
(f) When affidavits
are unavailable.
Should it appear from the
affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or
may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or
depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g)
Affidavits
made in bad faith.
Should it appear to the
satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits
presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order
the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any
offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Rules History
History: Amended effective November 1, 1997.
Rules Annotations
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63-2-304. Protected records.
Statute text

The following records are protected if properly classified by a
governmental entity:
(1) trade secrets as defined in Section 13-24-2 if the person
submitting the trade secret has provided the governmental entity
with the information specified in Section 63-2-308;
(2) commercial information or nonindividual financial information
obtained from a person if:
(a) disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected
to result in unfair competitive injury to the person submitting the
information or would impair the ability of the governmental entity
to obtain necessary information in the future;
(b) the person submitting the information has a greater interest
in prohibiting access than the public in obtaining access; and
(c) the person submitting the information has provided the
governmental entity with the information specified in Section
63-2-308;
(3) commercial or financial information acquired or prepared by
a governmental entity to the extent that disclosure would lead to
financial speculations in currencies, securities, or commodities
that will interfere with a planned transaction by the governmental
entity or cause substantial financial injury to the governmental
entity or state economy;
(4) records the disclosure of which could cause commercial injury
to, or confer a competitive advantage upon a potential or actual
competitor of, a commercial project entity as defined in Subsection
11-13-3(3);
(5) test questions and answers to be used in future license,
certification, registration, employment, or academic examinations;
(6) records the disclosure of which would impair governmental
procurement proceedings or give an unfair advantage to any person
proposing to enter into a contract or agreement with a governmental
entity, except that this subsection does not restrict the right of
a person to see bids submitted to or by a governmental entity after
bidding has closed;
(7) records that would identify real property or the appraisal
or estimated value of real or personal property, including
intellectual property, under consideration for public acquisition
before any rights to the property are acquired unless:
(a) public interest in obtaining access to the information
outweighs the governmental entity's need to acquire the property on
the best terms possible;
(b) the information has already been disclosed to persons not
employed by or under a duty of confidentiality to the entity;
© 2000 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., one of the LEXIS Publishing™ companies. All rights reserved.

2
(c) in the case of records that would identify property,
potential sellers of the described property have already learned of
the governmental entity's plans to acquire the property; or
(d) in the case of records that would identify the appraisal or
estimated value of property, the potential sellers have already
learned of the governmental entity's estimated value of the
property;
(8) records prepared in contemplation of sale, exchange, lease,
rental, or other compensated transaction of real or personal
property including intellectual property, which, if disclosed prior
to completion of the transaction, would reveal the appraisal or
estimated value of the subject property, unless:
(a) the public interest in access outweighs the interests in
restricting access, including the governmental entity's interest in
maximizing the financial benefit of the transaction; or
(b) when prepared by or on behalf of a governmental entity,
appraisals or estimates of the value of the subject property have
already been disclosed to persons not employed by or under a duty
of confidentiality to the entity;
(9) records created or maintained for civil, criminal, or
administrative enforcement purposes or audit purposes, or for
discipline, licensing, certification, or registration purposes, if
release of the records:
(a) reasonably could be expected to interfere with investigations
undertaken for enforcement, discipline, licensing, certification,
or registration purposes;
(b) reasonably could be expected to interfere with audits,
disciplinary, or enforcement proceedings;
(c) would create a danger of depriving a person of a right to a
fair trial or impartial hearing;
(d) reasonably could be expected to disclose the identity of a
source who is not generally known outside of government and, in the
case of a record compiled in the course of an investigation,
disclose information furnished by a source not generally known
outside of government if disclosure would compromise the source; or
(e) reasonably could be expected to disclose investigative or audit
techniques, procedures, policies, or orders not generally known
outside
of
government
if
disclosure
would
interfere
with
enforcement or audit efforts;
(10) records the disclosure of which would jeopardize the life
or safety of an individual;
(11) records the disclosure of which would jeopardize the security
of governmental property, governmental programs, or governmental
record-keeping systems from damage, theft, or other appropriation
or use contrary to law or public policy;
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(12) records that, if disclosed, would jeopardize the security
or safety of a correctional facility, or records relating to
incarceration, treatment, probation, or parole, that would
interfere with the control and supervision of an offender's
incarceration, treatment, probation, or parole;
(13) records that, if disclosed, would reveal recommendations made
to the Board of Pardons and Parole by an employee of or contractor
for the Department of Corrections, the Board of Pardons and Parole,
or the Department of Human Services that are based on the
employeefs or contractor's supervision, diagnosis, or treatment of
any person within the board's jurisdiction;
(14) records and audit workpapers that identify audit, collection,
and operational procedures and methods used by the State Tax
Commission, if disclosure would
interfere with audits or
collections;
(15) records of a governmental audit agency relating to an ongoing
or planned audit until the final audit is released;
(16) records prepared by or on behalf of a governmental entity
solely in anticipation of litigation that are not available under
the rules of discovery;
(17) records disclosing an attorney's work product, including the
mental impressions or legal theories of an attorney or other
representative of a governmental entity concerning litigation;
(18) records of communications between a governmental entity and
an attorney representing, retained, or employed by the governmental
entity if the communications would be privileged as provided in
Section 78-24-8;
(19) personal files of a legislator, including personal
correspondence to or from a member of the Legislature, but not
correspondence that gives notice of legislative action or policy;
(20) (a) records in the custody or control of the Office of
Legislative Research and General Counsel, that, if disclosed, would
reveal a particular legislator's contemplated legislation or
contemplated course of action before the legislator has elected to
support the legislation or course of action, or made the
legislation or course of action public; and
(b) for purposes of this subsection, a "Request For Legislation"
submitted to the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel
is a public document unless a legislator submits the "Request For
Legislation" with a request that it be maintained as a protected
record until such time as the legislator elects to make the
legislation or course of action public;
(21) research requests from legislators to the Office of
Legislative Research and General Counsel or the Office of the
Legislative Fiscal Analyst and research findings prepared in
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response to these requests;
(22) drafts, unless otherwise classified as public;
(23) records concerning a governmental entity's strategy about
collective bargaining or pending litigation;
(24) records of investigations of loss occurrences and analyses
of loss occurrences that may be covered by the Risk Management
Fund, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, the Uninsured Employers'
Fund, or similar divisions in other governmental entities;
(25) records, other than personnel evaluations, that contain a
personal recommendation concerning an individual if disclosure
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, or disclosure is not in the public interest;
(26) records that reveal the location of historic, prehistoric,
paleontological, or biological resources that if known would
jeopardize the security of those resources or of valuable historic,
scientific, educational, or cultural information;
(27) records of independent state agencies if the disclosure of
the records would conflict with the fiduciary obligations of the
agency;
(28) records of a public institution of higher education regarding
tenure evaluations, appointments, applications for admissions,
retention decisions, and promotions, which could be properly
discussed in a meeting closed in accordance with Title 52, Chapter
4, Open and Public Meetings, provided that records of the final
decisions about tenure, appointments, retention, promotions, or
those students admitted, may not be classified as protected under
this section;
(29) records of the governor's office, including budget
recommendations, legislative proposals, and policy statements, that
if disclosed would reveal the governor's contemplated policies or
contemplated courses of action before the governor has implemented
or rejected those policies or courses of action or made them
public;
(30) records of the Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst
relating to budget analysis, revenue estimates, and fiscal notes of
proposed legislation before issuance of the final recommendations
in these areas;
(31) records provided by the United States or by a government
entity outside the state that are given to the governmental entity
with a requirement that they be managed as protected records if the
providing entity certifies that the record would not be subject to
public disclosure if retained by it;
(32) transcripts, minutes, or reports of the closed portion of
a meeting of a public body except as provided in Section 52-4-7;
(33) records that would reveal the contents of settlement
negotiations but not including final settlements or empirical data
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to the extent that they are not otherwise exempt from disclosure;
(34) memoranda prepared by staff and used in the decision-making
process by an administrative law judge, a member of the Board of
Pardons and Parole, or a member of any other body charged by law
with performing a quasi-judicial function;
(35) records that would reveal negotiations regarding assistance
or incentives offered by or requested from a governmental entity
for the purpose of encouraging a person to expand or locate a
business in Utah, but only if disclosure would result in actual
economic harm to the person or place the governmental entity at a
competitive disadvantage, but this section may not be used to
restrict access to a record evidencing a final contract;
(36) materials to which access must be limited for purposes of
securing or maintaining the governmental entity's proprietary
protection of intellectual property rights including patents,
copyrights, and trade secrets;
(37) the name of a donor or a prospective donor to a governmental
entity, including a public institution of higher education, and
other information concerning the donation that could reasonably be
expected to reveal the identity of the donor, provided that:
(a) the donor requests anonymity in writing;
(b) any terms, conditions, restrictions, or privileges relating
to the donation may not be classified protected by the governmental
entity under this subsection; and
(c) except for public institutions of higher education, the
governmental unit to which the donation is made is primarily
engaged in educational, charitable, or artistic endeavors, and has
no regulatory or legislative authority over the donor, a member of
his immediate family, or any entity owned or controlled by the
donor or his immediate family; and
(38) the following records of a public institution of education,
which have been developed, discovered, or received by or on behalf
of faculty, staff, employees, or students of the institution:
unpublished lecture notes, unpublished research notes and data,
unpublished manuscripts, creative works in process, scholarly
correspondence, and confidential information contained in research
proposals. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to affect
the ownership of a record.
History

History: C. 1953, 63-2-304, enacted by L. 1991, ch. 259, § 21;
1992, ch. 228, § 3; 1992, ch. 280, § 28; 1994, ch. 13, § 5; 1994,
ch. 114, § 1; 1995, ch. 133, § 2; 1996, ch. 79, § 81; 1997, ch.
234, § 4.
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63-2-801. Criminal penalties.
(1) (a) A public employee or other person who has lawful access
to any private, controlled, or protected record under this chapter,
and who intentionally discloses or provides a copy of a private,
controlled, or protected record to any person knowing that such
disclosure is prohibited, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(b) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (1)(a) that
the actor released private, controlled, or protected information in
the reasonable belief that the disclosure of the information was
necessary to expose a violation of law involving government
corruption, abuse of office, or misappropriation of public funds or
property.
(c) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (1)(a) that
the record could have lawfully been released to the recipient if it
had been properly classified.
(2) (a) A person who by false pretenses, bribery, or theft,
gains access to or obtains a copy of any private, controlled, or
protected record to which he is not legally entitled is guilty of
a class B misdemeanor.
(b) No person shall be guilty under Subsection (2) (a) who
receives the record, information, or copy after the fact and
without prior knowledge of or participation in the false pretenses,
bribery, or theft.
(3) A public employee who intentionally refuses to release a
record the disclosure of which the employee knows is required by
law or by final unappealed order from a governmental entity, the
records committee, or a court, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 63-2-801, enacted by L. 1991, ch. 259, § 38;
1992, ch. 280, § 46.
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63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of
liability - Effect of waiver of immunity - Exclusive remedy Joinder of employee - Limitations on personal liability.
Statute text

(1) (a) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically
provided, may be construed as an admission or denial of liability
or responsibility by or for governmental entities or their
employees.
(b) If immunity from suit is waived by this chapter, consent to
be sued is granted, and liability of the entity shall be determined
as if the entity were a private person.
(c) No cause of action or basis of liability is created by any
waiver of immunity in this chapter, nor may any provision of this
chapter be construed as imposing strict liability or absolute
liability.
(2)
Nothing in this chapter may be construed as adversely
affecting any immunity from suit that a governmental entity or
employee may otherwise assert under state or federal law.
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), an action under
this chapter against a governmental entity or its employee for an
injury caused by an act or omission that occurs during the
performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of
employment, or under color of authority is a plaintiff's exclusive
remedy.
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other civil action
or proceeding based upon the same subject matter against the
employee or the estate of the employee whose act or omission gave
rise to the claim, unless:
(i) the employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice;
or
(ii) the injury or damage resulted from the conditions set forth
in Subsection 63-30-36 (3) (c) .
(4)
An employee may be joined in an action against a
governmental entity in a representative capacity if the act or
omission complained of is one for which the governmental entity may
be liable, but no employee may be held personally liable for acts
or omissions occurring during the performance of the employee's
duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of
authority, unless it is established that the employee acted or
failed to act due to fraud or malice.
History

History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 4; 1978, ch. 27, § 3; 1983, ch. 129,
§ 3; 1991, ch. 76, § 1.
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63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act
or omission of employee - Exceptions.
Statute text

Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for
injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an
employee committed within the scope of employment except if the
injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from:
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is
abused;
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious
prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel,
slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of
mental anguish, or violation of civil rights;
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the
failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit,
license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization;
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate
or negligent inspection;
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or
administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable
cause;
(6) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is
negligent or intentional;
(7) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob
violence, and civil disturbances;
(8) the collection of and assessment of taxes;
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard;
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county
or city jail, or other place of legal confinement;
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands,
any condition existing in connection with an abandoned mine or
mining operation, or any activity authorized by the School and
Institutional Trust Lands Administration or the Division of
Forestry, Fire and State Lands;
(12) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding
for the clearing of fog;
(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural
disasters;
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm
systems;
(15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven
in accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14;
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any
highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel,
bridge, viaduct, or other structure located on them;
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(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any
public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public
improvement;
(18) the activities of:
(a) providing emergency medical assistance;
(b) fighting fire;
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or
hazardous wastes;
(d) emergency evacuations; or
(e) intervening during dam emergencies; or
(19) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform any function pursuant to Title 73, Chapter 5a or Title 73,
Chapter 10 which immunity is in addition to all other immunities
granted by law.
History

History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 10; 1975, ch. 194, § 11; 1982, ch. 10,
§ 1; 1985, ch. 169, § 1; 1989, ch. 185, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 3;
1989, ch. 268, § 29; 1990, ch. 15, §§ 1, 2; 1990, ch. 319, §§ 1, 2;
1991, ch. 76, § 4; 1995, ch. 299, § 35; 1996, ch. 159, § 6; 1996,
ch. 264, § 1.
Annotations
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76-1-501. Presumption of innocence - "Element of the offense"
defined*
Statute text

(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be
innocent until each element of the offense charged against him is
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the
defendant shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense"
mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct
proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the
offense;
(b) The culpable mental state required.
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements of
the offense but shall be established by a preponderance of the
evidence.
History

History: C.
76-1-501.

1953,

76-1-501, enacted

by

L.
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76-5-102.4. Assault against peace officer - Penalty.
St-atute text

(1) Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge that
he is a peace officer, and when the peace officer is acting within
the scope of his authority as a peace officer, is guilty of a class
A misdemeanor.
(2) A person who violates this section shall serve, in jail or
another correctional facility, a minimum of:
(a) 90 consecutive days for a second offense; and
(b) 180 consecutive days for each subsequent offense.
(3)
The court may suspend the imposition or execution of the
sentence required under Subsection (2) if the court finds that the
interests of justice would be best served and makes specific
findings concerning the disposition in writing or on the record.
Histocy

History: C. 1953, 76-5-102.4, enacted by L. 1974, ch. 32, § 32;
1987, ch. 23, § 1; 1998, ch. 172, § 1.
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76-9-102. Disorderly conduct.
Statute text

(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if:
(a) he refuses to comply with the lawful order of the police to
move from a public place, or knowingly creates a hazardous or
physically offensive condition, by any act which serves no
legitimate purpose; or
(b) intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm,
or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he:
(i) engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening
behavior;
(ii) makes unreasonable noises in a public place;
(iii) makes unreasonable noises in a private place which can be
heard in a public place; or
(iv) obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic.
(2) "Public place," for the purpose of this section, means any
place to which the public or a substantial group of the public has
access and includes but is not limited to streets, highways, and
the common areas of schools, hospitals, apartment houses, office
buildings, transport facilities, and shops.
(3) Disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor if the offense
continues after a request by a person to desist. Otherwise it is an
infraction.
History

History: C. 1953, 76-9-102, enacted
76-9-102; 1999, ch. 20, § 1.

by

L.
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